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The Aspen Institute’s 34th annual Energy Policy Forum con-
sidered a host of issues comprising the challenge to the electricity 
industry of “Providing Energy Services in a Changing World.”
A group of energy leaders and policy experts invited to Aspen 
July 1 to 5, 2010, examined different visions for the future, explored 
obstacles to achieving these visions, discussed how other industries 
had dealt with transformative change, considered how climate 
change legislation might affect the electricity sector, and explored 
the challenges and opportunities for various primary energy sources.
The format of the Forum includes brief introductory presenta-
tions in each session  followed by extensive dialogue among diverse 
participants with different perspectives. To encourage candor and 
the freedom to explore new ideas, no one may be quoted by name 
or affiliation.
This year’s Forum was chaired by Duke Energy CEO James E. 
Rogers. One of the longest serving utility CEOs in the country 
and an active participant in the public policy arena, his experience 
allowed him to focus the discussion, and his skill and good humor 
kept difficult issues from becoming divisive. The highly qualified 
group of speakers and session chairs provided a wealth of informa-
tion, and the expertise of the well qualified group of participants 
added to the richness of the dialogue. 
v
Foreword
The Institute acknowledges and thanks the following Forum 
sponsors for their financial support. Most have been participants 
and supporters for many years. Without their generosity and com-
mitment to our work, the Forum would not be possible. 
On behalf of the Institute and the Forum participants, I also thank 
Gernot Wagner, who served as rapporteur. His ability to capture the 
highlights of a wide-ranging discussion and express them in lively 
language provides an example of policy writing at its best. Timothy 
Olson and Julia Bien-Aime managed the administrative arrangements 
for the Forum. Their hard work contributed to a smoothly run meet-
ing, and I am grateful for their support.
This report is issued under the auspices of the Aspen Institute. The 
chairs, speakers, participants, and sponsors are not responsible for 
its contents. It is an attempt to represent ideas and information pre-
sented during the Forum, but all views expressed were not unanimous 
and participants were not asked to agree to the wording.
 John A. Riggs
 Senior Fellow
 Energy and Environment Program
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July 1, 2010. Anyone following the path of an electron today could 
be excused for thinking he or she was in the wrong millennium.
“Dinosaurs” still rule the world. Large, central power stations 
produce the vast majority of electricity. Coal, natural gas, some oil, 
or uranium enters on one end. Electrons and various other byprod-
ucts—some innocuous, most not—leave on the other, pushed over 
long distances across aging transmission lines. Many get lost along 
the way.
Once at their final destinations, electrons are piped, anony-
mously, into businesses and people’s homes. The vast majority of 
customers don’t care about their origin or the way they get there, as 
long as they do, reliably, day after day.
Most people only interact with their utility when there is a ser-
vice interruption and, once a month, when a plain white envelope 
announces the previous month’s electricity use. The bill might 
include a quick chart, showing energy use compared to last year’s, 
but most still remains a mystery. The frequent reaction to a bill, any 
bill? Anger. Why so much? Which device was responsible? How can 
I save money?
Utilities see the world through entirely different eyes: How to 
convey the message that a $200 bill buys more and better services 
than $20? Electrons in 1980 supplied 3 devices in the average house-
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hold: the TV, the fridge, and the washing machine. Today, the num-
ber is 25. Should people even be our ultimate customers? Why not 
devices, leaving humans as payment authorizers? How to strike the 
trifecta of delivering “affordable, reliable and clean” electrons? How 
to stay nimble in an ever-changing world?
v
July 1, 2050, or perhaps as soon as 2020. Will dinosaurs still be 
around? Will they grow larger? Will they still be recognizable to 
someone today? Will they have learned to dance, treading lightly?
We know the “known unknowns,” in Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s 
words. At least we think we do.
We know there will be a price on carbon backed up, some think, 
by a limit on emissions, just not when and how high.
We know there will be tighter regulation of SOx, NOx, and other 
pollutants, just not when and in what ultimate form.
We know there will be more devices per household than today’s 
25; at least we think we do.
We know natural gas will challenge coal as the fossil fuel of 
choice, but how successfully?
We know that the current state-level regulatory regime will shift, 
just not how.
None of this even mentions what we simply don’t know. Worse, 
we don’t know what we don’t know. Few predicted the financial 
crisis. Fewer predicted the BlackBerry. Even fewer saw shale gas as 
a dominant force in U.S. energy policy by 2010 at a time when the 
majority of the fleet of coal powered plants now in operation was 
built. Call them “unknown unknowns,” black swans, or just good 
old surprises. Call them what you will, they define the outcome and 
likely the world in forty, twenty, or even ten years.
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Sir Arthur C. Clark is sometimes credited with saying that all 
change is overestimated in the short term and underestimated in the 
long term. He also wrote that:
“If we have learned one thing from the history of inven-
tion and discovery, it is that, in the long run—and often in 
the short one—the most daring prophecies seem laughably 
conservative.”
Which is it? And how should we prepare?
And what about the world beyond America’s shores? Electrons 
don’t travel well overseas. Other forms of energy do and, most 
importantly, so does money. It doesn’t take much to assume major 
shifts in the balance of power—the one related to geopolitics and 
the one linked to the production, distribution and use of electrons. 
Combine a slow economic recovery in the United States with severe 
budget constraints on federal, state and local levels, a shift away 
from central power generation, and a scenario where continued 
technological change will outstrip traditional utility regulation, and 
you very quickly end up in a world where the East, rather than the 
West, defines how electrons move from producer to consumer, 
and whether there will even be much of a distinction between the 
two. Who will hold the patents that define energy generation in the 
future?
Will distributed generation become disruptive in the best, 
Schumpeterian sense of the word and ring in an energy revolution 
akin to those in the communications or computing sectors? Or will 
disruption jeopardize reliability and affordability to a point where 
staid utilities become the most attractive model? Which type of 
dinosaur will survive: the Asian and European model of integrated 
electricity companies, or the common U.S. model of utilities as dis-
tinct from other entities in the energy supply chain?
What’s the role of policy? The internet was a government creation. 
Should the smart grid be one as well? Will regulation or technology 
day in thE LifE of an ELEctron
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come first? Will good policy spur a modernized grid and with it solar 
panels on each roof and an electric vehicle in each garage, or will 
distributed solar generation and EVs spur policy reform and be the 
enablers—rather than beneficiaries—of the smart grid?
v
July 1 through 5, 2010 saw the 34th incarnation of the Aspen 
Institute’s Energy Policy Forum. It started just as participants of the 
annual Security Forum were leaving the glorious Aspen Meadows 
campus, and it ended on the first day of the Ideas Festival—a fitting 
metaphor. Energy policy often starts as a fundamental question of 
security and ends with a cri de coeur for ideas.
This year’s Forum was no different. It raised many questions, 
provided some answers, and ended with a slew of ideas for how 
energy policy could look at the time of the 35th, 45th, and 55th 
incarnation.
All of these ideas and statements shall remain anonymous. That 
also goes for comments voiced during the open discussions. Most 
everything in this report has been borrowed liberally from others 
in attendance, often verbatim—without fear, favor, and without 
attribution.
5Envisioning the Future 
One possible vision of the future, call it “Seismic Shifts.”
First, a few assumptions: The United States economy will recover 
slowly, at least compared to the awesome, double-digit growth expe-
rienced in some emerging economies. Deficits in the West will only 
grow in the foreseeable future just as populations are aging, putting 
real strains on public finance, especially on the state level. All the 
while, Asian and other emerging economies grow and modernize 
rapidly.
The probable immediate consequences? Infrastructure invest-
ments will happen in Asia, the multi-speed recovery will endanger 
the unipolar world and lead to global shifts in power, causing risks 
of political instability in the West.
What does this mean for energy in the United States? For one, the 
search for lost win-win opportunities will intensify. Buildings and 
transport will become more efficient. Populations will be more urban, 
with more rental and fewer second homes, which all leads to less 
demand for primary energy, as long as we can overcome the inherent 
disincentives renters face to investing in efficiency improvements.
Slow or even negative demand growth will make large central 
station generation much less important. That includes new nuclear 
plants as well as utility-scale renewable developments, except as they 
are used to replace existing generation capacity.
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Underlying all of this is the assumption—not too far-fetched—
that technology will outstrip regulation and that state Public Utility 
Commissions (PUCs) will increasingly be sidelined to the point 
where they could even become irrelevant to energy policy-making 
in the United States.
These “Seismic Shifts” assumptions point to several themes. One 
is the shift to Asia, tied into what The Economist calls “frugal inno-
vation,” a search for technologies that benefit the budget-minded 
and ultimately the global poor. Health care is one such example with 
large shifts looming on the horizon. In the West, most equipment 
is built for large, centralized hospital systems. Rural Asian clinics 
require small-scale, cheap innovation, and that is where the trend is 
going. These trends in health care have immediate effects on energy, 
especially linked to battery storage and electric vehicles for better 
access. They also have parallels to the world of distributed energy 
generation, where small scale and local or regional independence will 
be in and large central generation and distribution systems may no 
longer be as attractive.
Another theme is the general move toward electrification, per-
haps best exemplified through the emergence of electric vehicle 
(EV) technologies. China is the fastest growing car market and has 
little legacy infrastructure. Cheaper and better EVs will be driven by 
demand in Asia.
EVs will also change the way electricity is produced. They can 
serve as grid storage and, thus, back up renewables when the sun 
does not shine or the wind does not blow. Clean technology and 
smarter grid infrastructures will lead to an entirely new energy sys-
tem unavailable (and perhaps unimaginable) in the West.
The large question is what this vision of Seismic Shifts entails for 
the dinosaurs in the field. On one level, adaptation in this new world 
is not a mandatory condition, so change is not absolutely required. 
On the other hand, of course, there may well be good reasons for 
large utilities to play a continued, strong role long after this vision 
has become a reality.
EnviSioning thE futurE 
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Adaptation entails a radical shift from past practices. The emphasis 
cannot be on changes on the margin—load shedding, load shifting or 
load shaping—but it ought to be on designing an entirely new system 
and mindset. Clean technologies will play a major role in this vision, 
as will building efficiency, EV storage, and distributed generation.
Most of all, thriving in this vision of the future requires true 
visionary leadership on top. As Henry Ford is often quoted as saying, 
“If I had asked my customers what they wanted, they would have 
said a faster horse.”
v
Another possible scenario sees changes akin to those in the tele-
communications sector over the past two decades, a shift to a more 
“Customer Centric” vision.
The breakup of AT&T in the early 1980s led to a dramatic change 
throughout the telecommunications industry. New technologies 
such as cellular phones emerged. Already existing technologies, most 
notably computers, became orders of magnitude smaller, faster and 
cheaper, culminating in dramatic changes brought about by the 
advent of the internet. It is not hard to recall a time before email 
and Google, mainstays of today’s life that were unavailable twenty 
years ago. The communications and information services industry 
went from meeting needs to creating wants, as evidenced by Apple’s 
iTunes, iPhone, and iPad. The energy industry may well be at a simi-
lar inflection point now. 
Today’s electricity sector is singularly focused on the production 
of electrons and has little connection with customers. Smart grid 
and smart metering technologies will usher in important changes, 
but it is not enough to wait for these technologies to emerge. The 
customer education process needs to start now. Energy is an essen-
tial component to meeting needs of new technologies and pursuing 
wants of commercial and residential users, but customers rarely link 
energy directly to the satisfaction that is sought. If anything, cheap, 
reliable energy is considered a “right.” This view will likely change 
dramatically with smart grid and smart meter communications, pro-
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viding information and energy efficiency technologies that will help 
customers manage their energy use in ways that fulfill their lifestyle 
goals and enable a new level of customer interaction.
As a first step, utilities ought to redefine the customer relation-
ship by providing more options and choices, leading customers to 
feel some sense of control when it comes to their energy bill. The 
more utilities are able to demonstrate to customers that it is “their” 
energy bill, the more value they may perceive because they will tie the 
purchase and use of equipment such as television sets to electricity 
usage. Right now, TV buyers for the most part simply don’t think 
about the ensuing electric bill. As a result, many make purchasing 
decisions without knowing that their electricity usage—and their 
monthly bill—will increase, sometimes dramatically.
This vision relies on technology more than anything else. It is not 
farfetched to think that electronic intelligence within the home will 
provide an opportunity for customers to dictate a reasonable month-
ly bill and have household devices take over to assure that happens.
Some utilities are already experimenting with models of greater 
customer engagement, sometimes with surprising results. Customers 
who volunteer for disruptible technology—appliances that can be 
turned off remotely by a utility in cases of severe electricity short-
ages—report the highest customer satisfaction, mainly because the 
utility has a direct connection with them.
Ultimately, the “Customer Centric” vision will lead to a world 
where customers can look at their monthly bill and say, “I get it,” 
much like what happens today with cable and cell phone bills. The 
more you pay, the more service you get, and you as the customer 
have the informed choice of determining the level of service.
v
Whether one believes the “Seismic Shifts” vision or the more 
modest but still potentially disruptive “Customer Centric” view, 
change is coming. The world will necessarily be more complex, 
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dynamic, volatile, global, non-linear, digital, virtual, distributed, and 
driven by unsuspecting, far-out events than in the past. Every indus-
try is going through this change. Energy will be no different. (Take 
the BP Gulf spill as the most prominent example of an unanticipated 
event with potentially enormous consequences for energy policy for 
years to come.)
What does this mean for how energy companies operate? One 
likely near-term change is the move toward distributed rather than 
centralized generation, toward light rather than large capital invest-
ments. This also means a further shift from monopoly to compe-
tition, from stable, regulatory environments to possibly volatile, 
market-based realities. 
This shift will be much more disruptive than the move toward 
independent power producers taking on regulated utilities in the 
1980s. Independent power producers still very much look like 
centralized utility companies. The new entrants will be the likes of 
Wal-Mart and Google. One is actively pursuing distributed genera-
tion and models of demand response that give it more control over 
its energy use; the other is entering the energy management services 
market. Neither is dependent on the whim of any single utility. It is 
also unclear whether either step requires regulatory approval. And 
what Wal-Mart and Google do, others will soon mimic or perhaps 
even surpass. Imagine what would happen if one of the larger car 
rental companies decided to change most of its fleet to EVs.
Perhaps the best analogy for the future of energy markets is the 
computer game Minesweeper. A single move can result in dramatic 
territorial expansion, or in everything blowing up all at once. That is 
not an appealing prospect for large incumbents, whose investments 
depend on stable demand projections and assurances of capital cost 
recovery through long-term purchasing commitments. It may well 
be a more appealing proposition to smaller, more nimble operators.
A requirement for any of these visions is the need for policymak-
ers to step in and set clear goalposts, given the current state of a 
high degree of policy uncertainty. For example, the reality of climate 
change mandates steep cuts in emissions of global warming pollut-
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ants. The big question—still, after over ten years of debate—is which 
form the policies will take and how they will interact with regulations 
for mercury, fine particulates and other criteria air pollutants that 
may soon face much tougher regulation.
The trend is clearly pointing toward cleaner generation. In 2008 
already, global investments in renewables exceeded those in fossil 
fuel generation. Even without policy certainty, renewables provide a 
built-in fossil fuel price hedge. Generators try to avoid investments in 
new fossil fuel-based generation and instead invest in subsidized or 
mandated sustainable generation. Still, U.S. utilities are often hesitant 
to invest in renewables without such a clear framework for action.
It may be difficult to predict the future, but legislators can take a 
large part of the guesswork out of the equation by setting clear policy 
objectives. With or without a transition to cleaner generation, utili-
ties need to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to replace aging 
plants and equipment. This money has to be raised from investors 
who are wary of uncertain goalposts. Taking the guesswork out of 
long-term investments by getting environmental policy right soon 
will mean a more affordable, more reliable, cleaner and, ultimately, 
more prosperous future for everyone involved.
 
Today is not the first time the U.S. utility sector has faced major 
transformations and some tough policy choices. The Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 ushered in a first wave of 
changes. Billed as a conservation policy to encourage independent 
power producers to enter the market with cogeneration and renew-
ables, the law morphed into the vanguard of electricity deregulation 
in the early 1980s.
PURPA prompted shifts in the financing model for power gen-
eration. Regulated utilities mitigated risk by passing costs to cus-
tomers through the regulatory process that approves new power 
plants and sets rates. The new crop of independent power producers 
emerging under PURPA used long-term contracts to deal with risk. 
These contracts allowed new entrants to attract financing for long-
life assets. Independent power producers managed to reduce costs 
significantly. Utilities used to build new generation for roughly 7 
cents/kWh. With PURPA, new entrants were able to lower costs to 
around 4 cents/kWh, although avoided cost rules in several states 
kept prices from falling proportionately.
Notably, PURPA’s implementation depended on state regulators. 
Some, like those in California, used the Act to jumpstart renewable 
builds and encourage co-generation, plants supplying both electric-
ity and steam. Many other states virtually ignored the Act.
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Carbon policy is today’s PURPA. Policy uncertainties abound, 
but even the most myopic scenarios—assuming no price on car-
bon—show significant investments in renewable and cleaner gen-
eration capacity, given that current laws already favor green invest-
ments over new coal plants. The higher the assumed carbon price, 
the higher are projections for clean investments. Big winners will 
be nuclear, wind, solar, and other renewables, but also natural gas, 
which is relatively cheap even without a price on carbon.
A climate bill could practically phase out conventional coal gen-
eration in the United States by 2050. Even gas generation might 
begin to decline well before that date. Carbon policy will have pro-
found impacts on U.S. generation decisions in the foreseeable future 
and for decades to come.
v
The energy sector can also learn by looking past its own history. 
Three comparisons seem particularly informative: airlines, telecom-
munications, and finance. All three industries have experienced 
major upheaval in the past couple of decades. At some point they 
have all been dominated by large incumbents that are now facing 
significant competition from upstart companies, some of which 
themselves have turned into major players.
Airlines present a particularly striking example, but not neces-
sarily (just) because of low-cost carriers challenging the majors. An 
even more important development is happening behind the scenes, 
in the way tickets are sold, managed, and distributed.
The entire sector has significant global economic staying power: 
a $500 billion industry with over one billion tickets sold per year. 
Sixty percent of all ticket sales go through indirect channels, which 
are dominated by three global distribution companies. The distribu-
tion price per ticket is fixed at around $15. Core distribution tech-
nology dates back some 30-plus years and focuses almost exclusively 
on price and schedule, not any other conveniences that make flying 
enjoyable.
Complexity has protected the industry’s three ticketing incum-
bents, but that is bound to change. Airlines are trying to reassert 
control of their own products across all distribution channels with-
out having to go through any of the three. In theory, the distribu-
tion price per ticket could be slashed to $2 from its current $15—a 
significant change anywhere and especially in such a low-margin 
business.
These changes would put airlines in much closer contact with 
their customers and enable them to look beyond seats as their sole 
product. Still, change has been slow. After decades, airlines are 
finally wresting control of their product from the incumbents. The 
main reason? Technology and an upstart entrant.
Negotiating with distribution companies has made little differ-
ence in decades. Now that new web-based systems can provide the 
same services much more cheaply, a new player has emerged claim-
ing to offer airlines everything they get from today’s incumbents, 
plus the benefit of new technologies, at a cost of $2 per ticket. This 
upstart will not uproot the entire industry overnight, but it—and 
possibly similar entrants—may bring about long-overdue changes.
v
Telecommunications has been completely transformed in the 
last three decades, starting with the breakup of AT&T. Today, there 
are three regional monopolies on landlines—AT&T, Verizon, and 
Quest/US West—but also many other moving parts, starting with 
mobile media. These changes did not happen by themselves.
Statutory impetus played a key role. In particular it helped 
merge two formerly separate industries. The 1996 U.S. Telecom 
Act, coupled with wireless spectrum auctions, has moved the voice-
centric telecommunications industry closer to the data-centric com-
puter sector. The profound implications hardly need elaboration. 
Hundreds of billions of dollars worth of shareholder value has been 
created since.
13
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These changes may well be dwarfed by coming changes in the 
energy sector. Landline telephony has achieved a 20-25 percent 
worldwide reach. Personal computing and data networks have 
achieved a 40-50 percent worldwide penetration in a fraction of the 
time. Cellular phones now reach 50-65 percent of people worldwide. 
Access to electricity is currently at a global penetration level of above 
70 percent.
This comparison also points to a significant difference between 
telecommunications and energy. Telecommunication companies 
largely grew into the void. Customer needs changed as technologies 
became available, and companies have ended up fulfilling demands 
that were unimaginable only a decade ago.
Electricity is different. Whatever energy revolution may come, 
or may already be under way, it is not growing into a void. Energy 
innovation, for the most part, will replace and update existing 
infrastructures rather than build entirely new ones. That gives util-
ity incumbents more opportunity for control. It also puts a greater 
burden on regulators to enable innovation while ensuring that basic 
needs are met.
v
Finance is a third industry ripe for comparisons with energy. 
Banking has undergone considerable periods of booms and busts in 
its thousand-year history. Most were periods of intense innovation 
followed by a bust and subsequent regulations trying to prevent 
problems of the past: innovation, boom, bust, regulation, innova-
tion, boom, bust, regulation. Almost by definition, regulators have 
been lagging behind the innovation trends. The latest cycle has 
proven to be no different, except that (de)regulators helped jump-
start the process.
In the 1960s, banking was a relatively stable industry. Four invest-
ment banks controlled two-thirds of the business. In the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, legislators and regulators took several steps that 
reverberated throughout the industry. Merchant banking started in 
earnest in the early 1980s, prompting a 25-year run that culminated 
in the spectacular crash of the late 2000s.
What caused all of this? The need for finance because of high eco-
nomic growth surely played one role. Disruptive technologies, like 
high-powered computing, globalized finance and likely contributed 
much more directly. But policy—or the lack thereof—had the larg-
est impact of them all.
Over-the-counter trading led to little or no transparency through-
out large parts of the finance sector. Putting liabilities off balance 
sheets allowed enormous amounts of leverage completely out of 
proportion to the underlying risks. And changing attitudes toward 
risk played another important role. Banking culture changed dra-
matically as risks were offloaded onto others.
Not unlike the telecommunications sector, we have already seen 
re-consolidation in banking as well. We are once again in a world 
where fewer than ten companies do most investment banking busi-
ness. Going forward, we will see less leverage, less profit, and also 
some risks that banks will migrate offshore. The charge once again 
falls on regulators to prevent the perilous cycle from repeating itself.
Perhaps the most important parallel to the energy sector is one 
related to the wider risk structure. Financial firms, much like utili-
ties, have traditionally socialized costs of their actions—unmitigated 
risk in one case, capital risk and pollution externalities in the other. 
Neither is sustainable, either in the financial or environmental sense 
of the word.
Once again, the burden is on policymakers to set the right 
framework for action. Utilities themselves have long experimented 
with alternative business models. As early as 1991, the Sacramento 
Municipal Utility District experimented with interruptible demand 
to turn off air conditioners for twenty minutes in return for a small 
payment to customers. 
15
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The question is how to set the right policies and create the right 
rewards structures to enable more innovation like that and also 
ensure its wider distribution. 
Now. Not in another twenty years.
Impediments to Achieving the Vision
Talking about impediments to achieving the vision assumes that 
there is indeed a vision.
There is a vague agreement that America needs a “clean energy 
economy,” but that is far from a unifying vision. We know the 
themes. We can draw up different scenarios—different visions—of 
the future. But what people mean by this, expressed in what policies 
they advocate, differs widely.
Lack of a single vision is intimately related to a host of uncertain-
ties: from the macroeconomic (around U.S. medium and long-term 
growth projections) to the regulatory (around timing and extent of 
environmental legislation and rules) to the technological (around 
the availability of a secure and reliable smart grid).
In the end, it is not just uncertainties that drive the outcome, it is 
disagreement over the value of policies, their cost to the economy, 
and, more than anything else, the distributional impacts (winners 
and losers) of the policies.
The underlying uncertainties and policy disagreements pose real 
challenges but also provide ample opportunities to actors within and 
outside the energy sector. They will imply new sets of winners and 
losers, which may well be unique to each regional and state market.
17
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Another key impediment to moving forward is the often arcane 
regulatory structure throughout the industry. Electricity generation 
is defined by a fractured, state-by-state regulatory system. The pres-
ent regulatory system may suit politics quite well, but it does not 
reflect the physical reality of electricity transmission. Electricity is a 
national not a parochial issue. Some states have decoupled markets, 
some don’t. Some are regulated, some deregulated. And it is not 
simply a states-versus-federal divide. Federal regulation itself is split 
into regions with regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and 
those without.
Disparate regulatory environments can be fruitful laboratories 
for policy experimentation and also encourage new entrants, but, on 
balance, they likely do more harm than good. It is clear that many 
squash innovation by incumbents.
One significant barrier in this context is the tendency of regu-
lators to choose winners and losers. In most cases, regulators are 
simply not in a position to decide among different innovations. That 
ought to be left to the market and, ultimately, the customer.
Despite talk about deregulation, the electricity industry remains 
one of the most heavily regulated industries in the United States. 
While the absence of regulation is unrealistic for such a critical 
industry, true innovation cannot thrive in the current environment.
Yet not all of the blame lies with legislators and regulators. 
Utilities are often as guilty. Instead of focusing on the final cus-
tomer, they tend to see regulators as their client and tailor innova-
tion and project ideas to them. That may be a prudent short-term 
strategy, but it hinders long-term changes. Innovation by incum-
bents means giving up control. That goes for utilities as much as 
for regulators. Most every regulated, incumbent firm has renewable 
energy groups within its organization. The question is how to give 
the right signals to each division and foster innovation from within. 
Of course, utilities may well require a strong regulatory impetus to 
in fact shift toward innovative new models instead of creating barri-
ers to potential new entrants.
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One potential barrier is the need for and possible difficulty in 
obtaining appropriate financing for new utility projects. The utility 
sector faces the unenviable task of investing in a forty-year cycle, 
while equity markets today are operating under extremely short time 
horizons. Add to that the fact that we are entering a period of invest-
ments unseen in over thirty years, and the problems become clear.
With more expensive financing come higher electricity rates. 
After years of near-constant rates in real terms, price increases due 
to financing constraints are very likely. Combined with carbon pric-
ing, which provides another reason why rates would go up, this may 
well lead to as of yet unseen increases and poses a clear threat to the 
industry. Most prominently, it may well lead to populist calls for less 
ambitious climate policy.
Another fundamental barrier is the lack of accurate and clear 
price signals throughout the electricity market. The smart grid holds 
enormous promise to put the customer in charge of his or her elec-
tricity demand, but the grid, no matter how smart, cannot live on 
new technologies alone.
The smart grid requires smart market design.
If price signals are mashed and squashed and averaged over time, 
the smart grid—any grid—will face enormous difficulties in reach-
ing its full potential. Accurate, transparent, real-time price signals 
throughout the entire grid are the sine qua non of policy design that 
can foster rather than impede innovation.
We also need to keep in mind that customers, in the end, care 
little about real time rates. Regulators care about rates. Customers 
care about monthly bills. Rates are part of the equation, but 
equally important are ways to respond to these rates in real time. 
That may well be something that requires new technologies and 
demand response mechanisms, which will allow customers to con-
trol monthly bills without having to worry about fluctuating rates 
themselves.
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The electricity sector has already experienced substantial shifts 
over the last ten to twenty years. We have seen decoupling of eco-
nomic growth and electricity use throughout the country. We have 
seen awesome technological leaps in renewables and grid design. We 
have also seen a general movement toward deregulation. However, 
regulators are not going to go away, nor should they.
The question facing the industry now is how to change regulation 
and how to adjust to this changed and changing regulatory environ-
ment. Ingrained institutional and other constraints are mindbog-
gling. At the very least, though, there is an emerging consensus that 
things ought to change. Here’s hope that this change will be for the 
better.
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Achieving a Low-carbon Future
Climate change is a real and present danger to our planet.
Comprehensive climate policy limiting greenhouse gas pollution 
is inevitable.
These are the starting points. It was hard to find anyone in Aspen 
who disagreed with them.
The question is when federal legislation will come and what form 
it will take. Who will be required to act? Who will be exempt? And, 
ultimately, will legislation do the job science requires it to do? Will 
we be able to put the framework in place now for steeper emission 
cuts later? Will we see one comprehensive legislative package or a 
patchwork of different efforts, updated over time with legislative 
uncertainty for years to come? 
We know that with or without carbon policy virtually every power 
plant except hydro will be replaced by 2050. One question is how 
fast this transition will happen and in which direction it will go. The 
longer we wait to set up clear goalposts for carbon policy, the costlier 
the transition will be.
So, when can we expect comprehensive legislation?
This was supposed to be the moment for action. Sixteen years 
after President George H.W. Bush signed and the Senate ratified the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, pledg-
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ing to prevent “dangerous anthropogenic interference with Earth’s 
climate system,” both presidential contenders in 2008 were strong 
supporters of climate action in general and economy-wide cap-and-
trade systems in particular. Then-Senator Barack Obama made it 
one of the pillars of his campaign. Senator John McCain had been a 
co-sponsor of climate bills in the past.  
The policies were all lined up. Market-based programs combined 
progressive policy goals (the cap) and conservative tools (the trade), 
enabling a bipartisan coalition. In fact, the House passed compre-
hensive climate legislation in June 2009, but the Waxman-Markey 
bill passed with little Republican support.
At the time of the Aspen Forum, all eyes were on the Senate. 
The policy was roughly the same; the politics were very different. 
Twenty-five percent of votes for the House bill came from New York 
and California. In the Senate, these two States command four per-
cent of the votes. In light of the politics, especially during an election 
year, the final outcome of a bill this year looked uncertain. Could it 
be a “power-sector first” cap? Would it be combined with a bill in 
response to the BP Gulf spill? Would there be an “energy-only” bill 
without establishing a price on carbon? If so, how would it be recon-
ciled with the House version?
The politics are tricky, in particular given the current demoniza-
tion of cap and trade. Most Aspen participants agreed that market-
based mechanisms are fundamentally the best idea. Tarnishing them 
irrevocably with election-year political calculations is not just bad 
policy; it is also bad politics in the long run. Of course, it is possible 
to oppose cap and trade and still put into place policies that decrease 
carbon emissions. Texas is a prime example. The state has put in 
place significant direct support for wind generation, through a direct 
command-and-control mandate, although it is unclear whether this 
approach can be taken nationwide and even less clear that it should.
Stepping back from the day-to-day politics, it is important to 
remember that whatever happens in Congress in the remainder of 
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2010, albeit very important, will likely pale compared to what will 
happen in the next few years, with or without Senate action.
One important element in the equation is regulation under the 
Clean Air Act. Almost three years after the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision giving EPA authority to regulate carbon dioxide, EPA has 
created stricter mobile source standards and, barring any further 
legislative changes, it will start regulating carbon from stationary 
sources in 2011.
While effective in some sectors, top-down EPA regulation will 
come at a  relatively high cost compared to comprehensive market-
based legislation. The prospect of this kind of regulation ought to 
serve as an inducement for Congress to take action with a better 
approach.
A crucial question is whether EPA may (legally) create a car-
bon cap-and-trade system under existing Clean Air Act authority. 
Probably. There is positive precedent from the limited emissions 
trading program in the 1970s, the highly successful lead phase-down 
in the 1980s, and the NOx budget program implemented in the early 
2000s. (By contrast, the successful sulfur dioxide trading program 
in the 1990s was created through legislation, the 1990 Clean Air 
Act Amendments.) Even more important, though, is the question 
whether EPA can (politically) create a significant carbon market. The 
answer to that question is less clear.
Sub-national policies such as California’s Global Warming 
Solutions Act (AB 32), the Western Climate Initiative, and the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the Northeast play 
another important role. Originally, most if not all of these programs 
were conceived as stepping stones toward federal legislation, but 
they may well have to stand on their own.
There can clearly be sensible state-level policies with an economy-
wide federal carbon-pricing policy in place. A federal cap-and-
trade system by itself would not address all market failures such as 
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principal-agent problems regarding energy-efficiency investments in 
renter-occupied properties, which requires the local application of 
sensible building codes.
However, in the absence of meaningful federal action, sub-
national climate policies would have to be the core of national 
action. That raises significant questions around their effectiveness. 
A patchwork of different state-level rules would lead to clear inef-
ficiencies that may render some of them much more expensive than 
necessary. Still, linkage of state and regional cap-and-trade may well 
become the de facto post-2012 national climate policy.
Leaving politics out of the equation, most agreed that the best 
alternative to economy-wide cap and trade in 2010 is economy-wide 
cap and trade in 2011, or even 2012. In reality, the answer to the 
question of what is the best alternative to economy-wide federal cap 
and trade in 2010 is more a political than an economic question.
In the end, a fundamental issue is that a large and growing minor-
ity of Americans does not even believe the climate is indeed in crisis. 
This is, in part, a result of the increasing polarization of our political 
system. It also points to a fundamental failure of communication. 
Bottom-up demand from the political populace for addressing this 
problem has not been the answer so far. In its absence, leadership 
from the top, bolstered by a very different communications strategy, 
will likely be necessary to get the message across. Talk of “capping 
smokestacks and taxing imported oil” might link good with bad 
policy. But it gets people’s attention and may well be good politics.
Another push may come from markets themselves. We have 
always operated under the assumption that climate policy will 
drive technology and innovation. Perhaps technology and innova-
tion—and the threat of being left behind in both areas—will prompt 
elected officials to act.
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Fueling the Future
Despite all the uncertainties, unknown unknowns, and political 
delays, paralysis is not an option. The energy industry needs to move 
forward. Fueling the future will require a portfolio of responses, and 
a mix of fuels. The contribution each can make may depend on tech-
nological advances or regulatory changes. 
Coal will likely continue to play a role in this mix, especially coal 
with carbon capture and storage (CCS). Advanced coal technologies 
still face some important technical, legal and policy issues, but a few 
states are already moving forward with enabling legislation and the 
U.S. Department of Energy is helping to fund several CCS demon-
stration projects.
The feasibility of CCS, ultimately, is a question of a price on car-
bon as well as of technological progress. Achieving capture rates of 
90 percent of carbon is technically achievable. Storage will still be 
a major issue, but the most fundamental question is that of costs. 
Total costs of CCS right now are around 6-8 cents/kWh. Those 
either need to be brought down to 4-5 cents or lower, or carbon 
needs to be priced into the equation, to make CCS viable. Without 
a steep price on carbon, which is unlikely in the near future, direct 
subsidies will be necessary. Those should aim both at basic research 
to bring the fundamental cost drivers down and also at deploying 
CCS at scale, for example through demonstration plants co-funded 
by the Department of Energy.
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Natural gas is a possible bridge to a low-carbon future. New gas 
plants are already underpricing new coal plants today, even without 
a price on carbon. There are abundant global resources, in particular 
in unconventional forms such as shale gas. This provides a marked 
shift from the situation only two or three years ago, when gas in the 
United States was seen by most as running up against real supply 
constraints. Environmental concerns about shale gas production 
may yet put these new reserves out of reach. If shale gas is environ-
mentally unsustainable, it will be politically unsustainable.
Still, gas alone—without CCS—can only be a bridge. It may be 
less carbon-intensive than coal, but it is still a fossil fuel after all 
and cannot be the full answer to the need to decarbonize. That may 
prompt calls for CCS for gas, which would likely entail the need for 
similar subsidies as in the case of coal.
One zero-carbon fuel is nuclear. The industry is experiencing a 
global renaissance with over 60 plants announced internationally, 
over 20 alone in China, and expectations are that all of them will, in 
fact, be built. Similarly, France will be starting to replace its entire 
fleet soon, while the policy situation in the United States is unclear.
The most optimistic predictions point to very little impact on 
the national fuel mix by 2020, although, in theory, we could have as 
many as 45 new plants by 2030. The major issue is the relative cost 
of nuclear power and the financing of large projects in such a vola-
tile policy environment. A concerted push for nuclear in the United 
States would likely require expanded financing guarantees and over-
all regulatory certainty.
A big problem for nuclear is that one serious accident anywhere 
in the world could derail nuclear efforts everywhere. The industry 
needs a strong international regulatory regime that puts safety first 
and a commitment by major international suppliers not to build 
new plants in countries without a strong safety infrastructure. 
The largest changes in the energy mix will be in energy efficiency 
and renewables. Efficiency is the ultimate low-cost energy resource. 
McKinsey estimates that the United States could reduce its overall 
Providing EnErgy SErvicES in a changing induStry
27
energy use by as much as 30 percent by 2030, while even saving 
money at the same time (assuming behavioral obstacles can be over-
come at no or low cost). The technologies are available today and 
are already in use in various forms. The question is how to enable 
consumer and utilities to monetize these efficiencies and to scale 
their use.
A sustainable energy policy will likely require “all of the above.” 
Barring major shifts, we cannot rely on any one fuel to revolutionize 
the future energy industry. A smart portfolio approach will require 
concerted, coordinated efforts. That will likely entail considerable 
trade-offs across sectors and tough decisions where limited funding 
ought to go.
Several potential interventions could make a real difference in the 
overall energy landscape and help bridge sector-by-sector differences.
First is a price on carbon, either by means of a cap or a tax. Short 
of that, a federal renewable energy standard could partially fill the 
void and overcome the patchwork of state-level standards. Other 
possibilities are federal tax incentives, nation-wide efficiency stan-
dards and a whole host of creative financing frameworks including 
HomeStar, alternative loan guarantees and others.
All of this requires more active government involvement in 
energy markets, in particular vis-à-vis funding of research and 
deployment. The American Energy Innovation Council talks about 
the need for $16 billion in federal clean energy funding, a three-fold 
increase of current funding levels. That would be a start. It will also 
be an important step to open up federal research funding. Currently, 
energy research and development funding decisions are largely an 
inside game. Research funding ought to be diversified to follow mul-
tiple paths and not simply go through existing channels.
Moreover, any research initiatives ought to include a focus 
on deployment of new technologies. That is the true strength of 
the Chinese push for renewable energy. New technologies will be 
important in the longer term, but most near-term gains lie in the 
fuELing thE f tu E
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aggressive deployment of existing renewable technologies, driving 
down costs and, thus, creating positive spillover effects for others.
None of this should overlook the power of markets and incen-
tives. One simple rule change around decoupling of utility revenue 
from sales can prompt enormous changes that reverberate through-
out the industry and make tapping into efficiency potential pay. All 
too often, there is an almost religious fervor to put too much faith 
into technological breakthroughs that makes it easy to overlook the 





“Providing Energy Services 
in a Changing Industry”
Chair:
James E. Rogers, CEO, Duke Energy
Friday, July 2
8:30 am—noon 
SESSion i: Envisioning the Future
This session will consider various visions for providing energy services in 
the future, including roles for existing providers and new entrants.
Chair: Jeff Sterba, Chairman, PNM Resources 
Speakers: Jeff Miller, Partner, The Tremont Group
 Michael Yackira, CEO, NV Energy
 Judy Warrick, Senior Advisor, Global Power  
 and Utility Group, Morgan Stanley 
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1:30—5:00 pm        
SESSion ii: Adapting to Change—Learning from Others
Other industries, and to an extent the electricity industry itself, have gone 
through or are going through transformational changes. How are they 
similar to or different from what may be facing the electricity sector, what 
were some of the unintended consequences of past changes, and what can 
be learned that will help in dealing with the coming transition in electricity?
Chair: Bill Dickenson, Executive Managing Director,  
 Navigant Consulting 
Speakers: Roger Naill, Senior Associate, IHS CERA; and  
 Founding Officer, AES Corp. 
 James K. Davidson, CEO, FareLogix Inc
 Arjun Gupta, Founder and Managing Director,  
 Telesoft Partners 
 William E. Mayer,  Partner, Park Avenue  
 Equity Partners 
Saturday, July 3
8:30 am—noon 
SESSion iii: Impediments to Achieving the Vision
Whatever the desired vision for the future, achieving it will require par-
ticipants to be flexible and able to determine their appropriate spot in 
the supply chain. It will also require the ability to overcome purposeful 
or inadvertent obstacles that may be imposed by the regulatory system, 
financial markets, entrenched or new entrants, or their own organizational 
behaviors and blind spots.
Chair: Peter Fox-Penner, Principal, The Brattle Group 
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 Dan Eggers, Managing Director, US Power and 
 Utilities, Credit-Suisse 
 Suedeen Kelly, Partner, Patton Boggs 
 Merribel Ayres, President, Lighthouse Consulting Group 
Sunday, July 4
8:00—11:30 am 
SESSion iv: Achieving a Low-carbon Future
Policy decisions on climate change and their timing could have a large 
impact on how the electricity sector develops. What is likely to happen 
with cap-and-trade legislation, what are the pros and cons of other policy 
options that might be adopted, what should be done in the near term if 
legislation is delayed, and what is the cost of delay?
Chair: James E. Rogers, CEO, Duke Energy  
Speakers: Jason Grumet, President, Bipartisan Policy Center 
 Robert Stavins, Harvard Kennedy School 
 David Hawkins, Director – Climate Programs, NRDC 
 Jeff Bingaman, Chair, US Senate Energy and Natural  
 Resource Committee 





SESSion v:  Fueling the Future
However electricity services are provided in the future, the question of pri-
mary energy sources will remain. What regulatory or institutional changes 
or technological advances are necessary to allow various fuels to make their 
maximum contribution to a secure, affordable and environmental sustain-
able future?
Chair: Ernie Moniz, Professor of Physics and Director,  
 MIT Energy Initiative
Speakers: Susan Tomasky, President, AEP Transmission
 Melanie Kenderdine, Executive Director,  
 MIT Energy Initiative 
 David Garman, Decker, Garman, Sullivan and  
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